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41. Introduction
Governments in about a hundred and fty countries around the world o¤er some kind
of old-age pension (social security) to their citizens. Most of these pension programs
have a substantial unfunded, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) component: the working young
are taxed and the proceeds nance a transfer (pension) to the existing retired elderly
(dened benet). Even though many of these programs have been around for nearly
a hundred years and routinely absorb 5-15% of G.D.P, the rationale for their very
existence continues to be hotly debated see Blake (2006) for a detailed discussion.1
Among academic economists, this debate started with a classic, justly-venerated
result, discussed originally by Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1975), and conducted
within the scope of a two-period overlapping-generations model with neoclassical pro-
duction (Diamond (1965) model) where the young supply their labor inelastically,
the old are retired, and there is no population growth. In that environment, suppose
there is a government that nances a xed payment (benet/pension) to each old
agent by collecting a lump-sum tax from each contemporaneously-alive young agent.
Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1975) showed that the introduction of such a pension
system can improve the stationary welfare of all two-period lived agents if and only
if the economy is initially dynamically ine¢ cient the net return on capital is less
than zero, the biological interest rate (Samuelson, 1958).2 Incidentally, there is
5no welfare justication for introducing a PAYG pension scheme if the economy is
initially dynamically e¢ cient. It is worth noting that, in this environment, these
two results are ip sides of the same coin; dynamic ine¢ ciency justies introducing
a PAYG pension scheme and dynamic e¢ ciency challenges it. Henceforth, we term
this the Aaron-Samuelson result.
The Aaron-Samuelson result, as exposited in textbooks such as Blanchard and
Fischer (1989), is a bit more nuanced in that use is made of Samuelsons correspon-
dence principle to require that the initial stationary state, the starting point of the
comparison, be dynamically stable. At a stable steady state, a small increase in the
benet level reduces private capital formation. Such crowding out of private capital
is justiable on welfare grounds if and only if the economy was overaccumulating
capital (dynamically ine¢ cient) to begin with.
The Aaron-Samuelson result provides a simple, potentially veriable condition:
a PAYG pension system is socially desirable if and only if the gross return on capital
is less than the economys growth rate. Later work by Abel, Mankiw, Summers and
Zeckhauser (1989), and more recently Barbie, Hagedorn, and Kaul (2004), suggested
that most developed economies, such as the U.S., are most likely dynamically e¢ -
cient ; by implication, a PAYG system in such countries is not desirable at least from
the standpoint of simple lifecycle models. Subsequent research has argued that dy-
6namic ine¢ ciency is just one, among a long list of reasons, justifying PAYG pension
systems.3
Our goal here is to revisit the Aaron-Samuelson result in the Diamond model the
environment studied by Samuelson (1975) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and
generalize it along two dimensions: a) allow for endogenous/elastic labor supply, and
b) permit a distortionary, payroll tax on young labor income.45 These two general-
izations unleash a wide range of general-equilibrium e¤ects and makes the analysis
daunting as the ensuing discussion lays bare. If labor supply is xed, a payroll tax
is no di¤erent than a lump-sum tax; ceteris paribus, the promise of a pension in the
future distorts the young agents saving decision, causing him to save less. This is
the classic crowding-out of private capital, alluded to earlier, that is at the heart of
the Aaron-Samuelson result. However, when labor supply is elastic/endogenous, a
payroll tax, by lowering the take-home wage, also distorts the labor supply decision.
If the substitution e¤ect is dominant, ceteris paribus, the young agent supplies less
labor (because leisure is relatively cheaper) and receives less income, which further
serves to depress savings. In general equilibrium, this reduction in saving causes the
aggregate capital stock to fall. However, since aggregate employment falls too, the
question remains: what happens to the capital-labor ratio, and hence, the wage and
the interest rate? Evidently, the answer to this question is critical in establishing the
7direction of the welfare e¤ects of PAYG pensions.
It turns out that a su¢ cient condition for the introduction of a PAYG system to be
welfare enhancing in a dynamically-ine¢ cient economy is that the capital-labor ratio
falls. Interestingly, under that same condition, the introduction of a PAYG system
is welfare reducing in a dynamically-e¢ cient economy. In other words, a su¢ cient
condition for the Aaron-Samuelson result to hold in the more general environment is
that the capital-labor ratio falls.6 So, when does this happen? This is where matters
get complicated. To sort things out, we rst explore the simpler case of lump-sum tax
nancing of the pension with elastic labor supply. Here, we show that, introduction
of a PAYG pension causes the aggregate capital stock to fall, irrespective of dynamic
e¢ ciency. However, aggregate employment rises (falls) in a dynamically-e¢ cient
(ine¢ cient) economy. It follows that there is no welfare case for introducing a lump-
sum tax nanced PAYG pension in a dynamically-e¢ cient economy. But now, the
ip side, the case for a PAYG pension in a dynamically-ine¢ cient economy, is no
longer clear-cut.
We go on to study the more-di¢ cult case of distortionary tax nancing of the
pension under elastic labor supply. Here, we are able to show the following: un-
der the fairly-mild restriction that the old be no less risk averse than the young,
the Aaron-Samuelson result survives in a Diamond model with elastic labor supply.
8That is, under this one restriction, there is no welfare case for introducing a pay-
roll tax-nanced PAYG pension in a dynamically-e¢ cient elastic labor economy, and
parenthetically, there is a welfare rationale for the pension in an otherwise-identical,
dynamically-ine¢ cient economy. It is important to note that the aforementioned
restriction is merely a su¢ cient condition, simple and arguably realistic.
The current paper is closest in spirit to pioneering work by Breyer and Straub
(1993), discussed in Blake (2006). Their primary focus is on the following issue.
Suppose a comparison of the net return to capital with the net biological interest
rate reveals that the PAYG system in place is undesirable. Would abolition of such
a system (and replacement by a fully funded system) lead to an intergenerational
Pareto improvement considering the fact that the young alive would have paid into
the system but would not get anything in return? Breyer and Straub (1993) prove
that a necessary condition for such improvement is if, in the process, labor supply is
distorted.
They go on to ask: are such static distortions to labor supply enough to justify a
transition to the fully funded system? It is here that their focus is aligned with ours
as their question may be re-interpreted as indirect interest in the Aaron-Samuelson
result for economies with endogenous labor supply. To answer this question, they
focus only on steady states and consider the steady-state welfare of a representative
9two-period lived agent. Additionally, they study a PAYG system in which the con-
tribution by the young is in the form of a distortionary payroll tax on young labor
income, and the benet to the pensioners is actuarially and intergenerationally fair:
it is tied to ones labor supply (dened contributions). In this setting, they show
that, in a dynamically e¢ cient economy, a su¢ cient condition for steady-state wel-
fare to fall with the payroll tax rate is that private capital does not increase with the
payroll tax rate.
It is instructive to compare our work directly to Breyer and Straub (1993). We
study a PAYG system with a xed common benet level (dened benets), i.e., the
scheme is not actuarially fair. This permits more direct comparison with the classic
statements of the Aaron-Samuelson result. We go further than them because we inte-
grate insights regarding stability of steady states from Nourry (2001). Specically, we
prove that if the initial steady state is dynamically e¢ cient and saddle-point stable,
a su¢ cient condition for our version of the PAYG system to be welfare-undesirable is
that the capital-labor ratio does not increase with the benet level. Perhaps most im-
portantly, Breyer and Straub (1993) are largely silent on the important issue: when
does their su¢ cient condition hold? In comparison, we show that if the old are no
less risk-averse than the young, our su¢ cient condition holds under fairly reasonable
restrictions. The upshot is that we can denitively claim to have shown that the
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classic Aaron-Samuelson result, under a mild condition, extends to economies with
endogenous labor supply (something that Breyer and Straub (1993) cannot).
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the environment
of the model, a generalization of Diamond (1965) to endogenous labor supply. Section
3 describes the perfect-foresight competitive equilibria and their comparative static
properties; it also derives a condition for saddle-path stability of a steady state. In
Section 4, we derive our main results, while Section 5 concludes. Proofs of all major
results are to be found in the appendices.
2. The model
Consider a textbook version of the overlapping-generations model with production
due to Diamond (1965) augmented to allow for endogenous labor supply. The econ-
omy consists of an innite sequence of two-period lived overlapping generations, an
initial old generation, and an innitely-lived government. Let t = 1; 2; ::: index time.
At each date t, a new generation comprised of a continuum of measure one of iden-
tical members appears. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor when young
and is retired when old. In addition, the initial old agents are endowed with K1 > 0
units of capital.
There is a single nal good produced using a standard neoclassical production
function F (Kt; Lt) displaying constant returns, where Kt denotes the capital input
11
and Lt denotes the labor input at t: Let kt  Kt=Lt denote the capital-labor ratio
(capital per young agent). Then, output per young agent at time t is f(kt) where
f(kt)  F (Kt=Lt; 1) is the intensive production function. We assume that f 0 > 0 >
f 00; and that the usual Inada conditions hold. The nal good can either be consumed
in the period it is produced, or it can be stored to yield capital the following period.
For reasons of analytical tractability, capital is assumed to depreciate 100% between
periods.
Let c1t (c2t+1) denote the consumption of the nal good at date t (date t + 1)
by a representative young (old) agent born at t. Let Lt denote the labor supply
at date t by a young agent. All such agents have preferences representable by the
time-separable utility function
U(c1t; c2t+1; Lt)  u (c1t) + v (c2t+1)  d (Lt) (1)
where u; v and d are twice continuously di¤erentiable, u00 < 0 < u0; v00 < 0 < v0,
and d0 > 0; d00 > 0. We assume the standard limit conditions (see Nourry, 2001,
Assumption 1, for example) that would ultimately preclude corner optima.
Young agents supply labor in competitive labor markets, earning a wage of wt at
12
time t; where
wt  w(kt) = f(kt)  ktf 0(kt) (2)
and w0(kt) > 0: In addition, capital is traded in competitive capital markets, and
earns a gross real return of Rt+1 between t and t+ 1; where
Rt+1  R (kt+1) = f 0(kt+1) (3)
with R0 (kt+1) < 0:
The government runs a standard pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system in each
period. It levies a payroll tax () on each young worker so as to nance a lump-sum
transfer of B  0 to each of the current retired. The government budget constraint
is
 twtLt = B (4)
The benet level is taken to be the policy variable (dened benet scheme), and
hence, the payroll tax rate is adjusted using (4) to keep the budget balanced.7 Since
population size does not grow, the net rate of return on the PAYG scheme is zero.8
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Each young agent, born at date t  1; chooses how much to consume in each pe-
riod of life and how much labor to supply when young, by maximizing U(c1t; c2t+1; Lt)
subject to
c1t = (1   t)wtLt   St (5)
c2t+1 = Rt+1St +B (6)
along with c1t  0; c2t+1  0 and Lt 2 [0; 1] ; here S denotes individual saving. Each
initial old agent faces the following budget constraint: c21  R1S0 +B.
The optimization problem of young agents, for a given  t, can be re-stated as
max
L2[0;1]; S2(0;(1 )wL)
  (L; S;  ; w;B)  u ((1  )wL  S) + v (RS +B)  d (L) ;
where, for the moment, time subscripts have been removed. The rst order conditions
to the agents problem, assuming interior solutions, are given by
 L  u0 () (1  )w   d0 () = 0 (7)
 S   u0 () +Rv0 () = 0: (8)
14
For future use, note
 LL = u
00 () ((1  )w)2   d00 () < 0;
 LS =  u00 () (1  )w > 0;
 SS = u
00 () +R2v00 () < 0;
 SL =  u00 () (1  )w > 0:
The second order conditions to the agents problem are satised if  LL < 0 (which
is true) and if D   SS LL    SL LS is positive. Notice,
D   u00 () +R2v00 ()  u00 () ((1  )w)2   d00 ()  (u00 () (1  )w)2
= R2v00 ()u00 () ((1  )w)2   d00 ()  u00 () +R2v00 () > 0 (9)
and hence, the second order conditions are satised. For future use, dene the
Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion for old and young-age felicity to be
v   c2v
00 ()
v0 () ; u   
c1u
00 ()
u0 () : (10)
Henceforth, we assume the following holds for any  2 [0; 1]:
Assumption A1 u0() + u00()(1  )wL  0
15
Assumption A2 v  1
Note Assumption A1 is the well-known condition from static models that the sub-
stitution e¤ect of a tax increase dominates the income e¤ect. As noted below, this
ensures that optimal labor supply is rising in the wage and falling in the tax rate.
Noting that
u0() + u00()(1  )wL = u0()

1  u + u
00()
u0() S

;
it follows that a necessary condition for Assumption A1 to hold is
u  1: (11)
This requires the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion for young-age felicity
to be less than unity, an assumption we maintain below. Assumption A2, in turn,
requires the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion for old-age felicity to be less
than unity, which ensures that optimal saving is increasing in its return. It deserves
mention that Assumption A2 and (11) are merely su¢ cient conditions that help
to render the ensuing analysis tractable. This fact is explored further in examples
below.9
For future use, we collect well-known information on a young agents optimal
16
(partial equilibrium) labor supply and savings in the lemma below. A word on
notation: if Y = Y (x; z) ; then Yx  @Y@x :
Lemma 1. a) A young agents optimal labor supply is described by
L = L( ; B;w;R) (12)
where
L < 0; LB < 0; Lw > 0; LR > 0; (13)
and
b) A young agents optimal savings function is summarized by
S = S( ; B;w;R) (14)
where
S < 0; SB < 0; Sw > 0; SR > 0: (15)
The proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix A. Some intuition for the partial-equilibrium
17
results in Lemma 1 is in order. If the labor supply is xed, a payroll tax is equivalent
to a lump-sum tax. In this case, ceteris paribus, a bigger pension raises the future
income of the agent. This distorts his savings decision, causing him to save less.
When labor supply is endogenous, a payroll tax, in addition, distorts the labor mar-
ket decision. That is, ceteris paribus, the higher payroll tax required to nance the
bigger pension lowers the after-tax wage, which in turn unleashes income and sub-
stitution e¤ects for the labor supply decision. If the substitution e¤ect is dominant
(Assumption A1), the young agent supplies less labor (because leisure is relatively
cheaper) and receives less income, which further serves to depress savings.
The arguments presented above may be used to foreshadow results to come.
In general equilibrium, the aforediscussed reduction in saving causes the aggregate
capital stock to fall. However, if the aggregate labor supply falls too, the question
remains: what happens to the capital-labor ratio? It turns out that the answer to
this question (explored in Section 4 below) is critical in establishing the direction of
the welfare e¤ects of PAYG social security.
3. Equilibria
Using the government budget constraint,  t = B=wtLt; (12), and (14), the (general)
equilibrium employment level and capital stock (denoted with a ^on top) can be
18
written
bL(B;wt; Rt+1)  L(B=wtLt; B; wt; Rt+1) (16)
bS(B;wt; Rt+1)  S(B=wtLt; B; wt; Rt+1): (17)
Since the aggregate saving of the young at any date becomes the start-of-period
capital for the next date, and the size of the young at any date is normalized to
unity, we have
Kt+1 = St; (18)
where St is dened in eq. (14) above. Since each young agent supplies Lt units of
labor, we have
kt+1Lt+1 = St: (19)
Perfect-foresight competitive equilibria are sequences fktg1t=2 that satisfy (19),
given the initial k1 > 0; and (16), (17), (4), (2) and (3). Specically, they are
dynamic sequences fktg1t=1 that satisfy
kt+1 bL (B;w (kt+1) ; R (kt+2)) = bS(B;w (kt) ; R (kt+1)) (20)
19
3.1. Steady state. Steady state equilibria are time-invariant sequences, k; that
satisfy (20), or more specically, for given B; satisfy
k bL (B;w (k) ; R (k)) = bS(B;w (k) ; R (k)): (21)
The next lemma sets out conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state
equilibrium.
Lemma 2. (Nourry, 2001) Dene
 (k)  k  
bS(0; w (k) ; R (k))bL (0; w (k) ; R (k)) : (22)
Under the previously-made assumptions, if a) limk!0 (k)  0; and b) 0 (k) >
08k > 0; then there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium, k:
In general though, as discussed in Nourry (2001), Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004),
and Nourry and Venditti (2006), conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a
steady-state equilibrium in the Diamond (1965) model with endogenous labor supply,
are involved and unintuitive; more so, when B > 0: For our purposes, it su¢ ces to
assume that a unique steady-state solution to (20) exists.
Also for future reference, note that a steady-state equilibrium, k; will be called
dynamically e¢ cient if R (k) > 1; dynamically ine¢ cient if R (k) < 1; and the golden
20
rule if R (k) = 1.
3.2. Comparative statics general equilibrium responses. In a steady-
state equilibrium, the aggregate capital stock is given by
bK (B)  bS B; w bK (B)bL(B)
!
; R
 bK (B)bL(B)
!!
; (23)
and equilibrium aggregate employment by
bL (B)  bL B; w bK (B)bL(B)
!
; R
 bK (B)bL(B)
!!
; (24)
and bk  bK=bL:
We proceed to determine the properties of equilibrium optimal savings and labor
supply. Note these cannot be read o¤ the individual responses (13)-(15) discussed
above since those had not taken the government budget constraint into account.
Using (4), we can re-write (7) and (8) in steady states as
u0

wbL B   bSw   BbL

  d0
bL = 0 (25)
21
and
 u0

wbL B   bS+R  v0 RbS +B = 0 (26)
Hence, totally di¤erentiating (25)-(26) yields
u00 ()
hbL@w + w@bL  @B   @ bSi w   BbL

+ u0 ()

@w   1bL@B + BbL2@bL

  d00 () @bL = 0
 u00 ()
h
L@w + w@bL  @B   @ bSi+ v0 () @R +Rv00 () hbS@R +R@ bS + @Bi = 0:
Eventually, we will require knowledge of these equilibrium responses locally near
B = 0: To that end, evaluating these expressions at B = 0 yields

u00 ()w2   d00 () @bL+ [ u00 ()w] @ bS = h u00 ()wbL  u0 ()i @w + u00 ()w + u0 ()bL

@B (27)
[ u00 ()w] @bL+ u00 () +R2v00 () @ bS = u00 () bL@w   [u00 () +Rv00 ()] @B   hv0 () +Rv00 () bSi @R:(28)
From here, the di¤erent equilibrium responses are easily computed using Cramers
rule. For future reference, dene
0v   
c2v
00 ()
v0 () jB=0 ; 
0
u   
c1u
00 ()
u0 () jB=0 ; (29)
22
the expressions in (10) evaluated at B = 0: Recall under Assumption A2 and (11),
0v  1 and 0u  1 (30)
are assumed to hold.
We collect information about several general-equilibrium responses in the follow-
ing lemma. Lemma 3 builds on the results of Lemma 1 by requiring that optimal
decisions (in equilibrium) by the agent also respect the government budget constraint.
It treats w;R; and B as exogenous variables, and studies the impact (evaluated near
B = 0) on optimal choices by changing one parameter at a time.
Lemma 3. Evaluated in equilibrium at B = 0;
a)
bSw
B=0
> 0; bLw
B=0
> 0
b)
0v < 1() sign bLR
B=0
= sign bSR
B=0
> 0 (31)
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c)
bSB
B=0
< 0;
and
d) if R < 1;
bLB
B=0
< 0:
A few words about Lemma 3 are in order. Assumption A1 (substitution e¤ect
dominates the income e¤ect of a payroll tax increase) ensures that optimal employ-
ment increases with the wage. Assumption A2 (substitution e¤ect dominates the
income e¤ect of a increase in the interest rate) ensures that optimal saving increases
with its return. Ceteris paribus, an increase in B increases future income and de-
presses saving; it reduces young labor supply if R < 1: Why? Ceteris paribus, an
increase in future income reduces the need to save (and hence, reduces the desire to
earn more current income). When R < 1; an unit saved would bring less than one
in the future, further depressing the desire to save. When R > 1; there would be a
countervailing and confounding e¤ect increasing the need to work more when young
and save.
24
3.3. Stability. As discussed by Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Samuelsons cor-
respondence principle suggested a tight link between the stability properties of a
steady state and its comparative static properties. Since the ultimate goal of the pa-
per is to establish a particular comparative static property, we start o¤ by studying
the stability properties of a steady state. To that end, we linearize (20) around a
steady state (evaluated near B = 0) to get
bLekt+1 + bk hbLwwkekt+1 + bLRRkekt+2i = bSwwkekt + bSRRkekt+1;
where the tilde over k denotes deviation from its steady-state value, and where
Xj denotes the derivative of the function X with respect to the variable j (and
j 6= t + n; n = 0; 1; 2). Using wk =  kRk > 0; and re-organizing the previous
equation, we get
bk bLRRkekt+2 + hbL  k bLwkRk  bSRRki ekt+1 + bSwbkRkekt = 0
and nally, ekt+2 + A1 ekt+1 + A0 ekt = 0; where
A1 
bL  bkbLwbkRk  bSRRkbk bLRRk < 0; A0 
bSwbLR > 0:
25
The sign conditions follow from Rk < 0; and Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. a) Evaluated near B = 0; a steady state, bk; is saddle-point stable if
hbL+ h bLR
B=0
  bk bLw
B=0
i bkRk   bSR
B=0
Rk + bSw
B=0
bkRki > 0 (32)
holds.
b) If 0 (k) > 0 holds (where  (k) is dened in (22) above), then (32) is satised,
implying if the steady state k is unique (see Lemma 2), it is saddle-point stable.
This extends the result in Nourry (2001) to the case with a tax-nanced pension
scheme (dened benets).
4. Welfare effects of a public pension
The government is assumed to be utilitarian. It determines the benet level B by
maximizing the lifetime utility of an agent in a steady state. The governments
objective function, by use of (4), can be written as
U (B) = u
 
w
 bK (B)bL (B)
! bL (B) B   bK (B)!
+v
 
R
 bK (B)bL (B)
! bK (B) +B!  dbL (B) ;
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where the general equilibrium employment and capital stock are given by (24) and
(23) respectively. A marginal change in the benet level brings about a change in
agent welfare by an amount:
U 0 (B) = u0 ()
24w @bL
@B
+ w0
 bKbL
! bL@  bKbL 
@B
  1  @
bK
@B
35
+v0 ()
24R0 bKbL
! bK@  bKbL 
@B
+R
@ bK
@B
+ 1
35  d0 bL @bL
@B
:
Using the rst order conditions (7) and (8) as well as the government budget con-
straint (4), the above optimality condition can be written compactly as
U 0 (B) = v0()
"
(1 R) + (R  1) w0
bk bL @bk
@B
+Rw
bk @bL
@B
#
: (33)
4.1. General equilibrium e¤ects. Broadly speaking, introducing a unfunded
pension or raising the promised benet level innitesimally has three e¤ects: (i)
savings-e¤ect, (ii) capital-labor substitution e¤ect, and (iii) labor supply e¤ect. The
savings e¤ect is the most standard and well-known (since Aaron, 1966). If the initial
equilibrium is characterized by R > 1 (dynamic e¢ ciency), it follows that an increase
in benets lowers utility since it shifts savings out of capital (with gross return R)
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into the PAYG-pension with a gross return of 1. The capital-labor substitution e¤ect
emerges because the composition of income according to its source, wages or capital,
matters it matters because wage income is earned when young and capital income
when old. If R = 1; this composition does not matter. However, if R > 1, there is,
on the margin, a gain from shifting to wage from capital income since the former can
be invested with a return factor R > 1. In that case, if a benet increase leads to an
increase in the capital-labor ratio ( @bk
@B
> 0), then such a benet increase is welfare
improving. The opposite holds if @bk
@B
< 0. Finally, as previously discussed, the labor
supply e¤ect arises because the labor supply decision is distorted by the payroll tax
 indeed employment is ine¢ ciently low. In this case, if a benet increase raises
employment, the e¤ect on welfare is positive.
It is readily apparent from (33) that the issue of whether public pensions are
desirable is not settled simply by dynamic e¢ ciency or ine¢ ciency. In some specic
cases, a bit more information can be gleaned from (33). For example, in the case of
exogenous labor supply, it is well-known that @bk
@B
< 0 holds at a stable steady state
(see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989). Hence, it follows from (33) that sign U 0 (B) = sign
(1   R), a restatement of the classic Aaron-Samuelson result. Similarly, additional
information on this issue may be obtained near the golden rule. When R = 1; i.e.,
the economy is initially at the golden rule, and labor supply is elastic, increasing the
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size of public pensions is not welfare neutral because of the income tax distortion to
labor supply. If a lump-sum tax is available, then at the golden rule, the optimal
size of the public pension is zero. A version of this last statement is also discussed
in Blake (2006), chapter 4.
One nal point of note. It is clear from (33) that, in general, if U 0 (B) < 0 holds
when R > 1; it does not follow that U 0 (B) > 0 holds when R < 1: That is, if dynamic
e¢ ciency implies PAYG pensions are undesirable, then dynamic ine¢ ciency may
not imply PAYG pensions are desirable. And yet, as discussed above, in the case
of exogenous labor supply, this bi-directional implication of the Aaron-Samuelson
result is true.
4.2. Local results. The strategy in the following is to consider the marginal
value of introducing a small public pension if there is none to begin with. It follows
from (33), for B =  = 0;
U 0 (0) = v0() (1 R)
"
1  w0
bk bL @bk
@B

B=0
#
: (34)
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It is immediate from (34) that if R > 1; a small increase in the size of the pension
starting from a size of zero is welfare reducing if it is the case that
@bk
@B

B=0
< 0 (35)
holds. In other words, in a dynamically-e¢ cient economy, a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for U 0 (0) < 0 is that 1   w0
bk bL @bk
@B
> 0; a su¢ cient condition is that
@bk
@B

B=0
< 0: Put di¤erently, there is no welfare rationale for introducing a PAYG sys-
tem in a dynamically-e¢ cient economy if @bk
@B

B=0
< 0; i.e., the pension system crowds
out the equilibrium capital-labor ratio. Similarly, it follows from (34) that if R < 1;
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for U 0 (0) > 0 is that 1   w0
bk bL @bk
@B

B=0
> 0;
a su¢ cient condition is that @bk
@B

B=0
< 0; the same as in (35).10 In other words, the
bi-directional implication of the Aaron-Samuelson result discussed earlier is restored
locally near B = 0: We summarize the above discussion in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. A small increase in the size of the pension, starting from a size of
zero, is welfare enhancing (reducing) in a dynamically ine¢ cient (e¢ cient) economy
if (35) holds in equilibrium.
A limited version of this result appears in Breyer and Straub (1993). For us, the
issue boils down to, when does the su¢ cient condition (35) hold, the subject matter
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of the following lemma.
Lemma 5. a)
@bk
@B

B=0
=
bSB
B=0
  bk bLB
B=0bL  h bSw
B=0
wk + bSR
B=0
Rk
i
+ bk h bLw
B=0
wk + bLR
B=0
Rk
i :
b) If k is saddle-point stable, i.e., (32) holds,
sign
@bk
@B

B=0
= sign
h bSB
B=0
  bk bLB
B=0
i
;
where bSB and bLB are computed in Lemma 3.
The upshot is that use of the stability condition allows us to state a su¢ cient
condition for (35) in terms of the equilibrium saving and labor supply responses to
the public pension, i.e.,
@bk
@B

B=0
< 0, bSB
B=0
  bk bLB
B=0
< 0 (36)
It is clear from (36) that the magnitude and direction of the saving and labor supply
responses (to a change in the pension) will be crucial in what follows.
The thrust of models with exogenous or perfectly inelastic labor supply
bLB = 0
is that for dynamically-ine¢ cient economies, there is a case for public pensions if
31
private savings (capital) is crowded out (bSB < 0). This is the well-known Aaron-
Samuelson result. With endogenous or elastic labor supply, however, the crowding
out of capital is simply not enough; after all, it may be theoretically possible for
labor supply to decrease
bLB < 0 enough so that the capital-labor ratio increases
@bk
@B
> 0

even though the capital stock falls (bSB < 0).
Lump-sum tax. We start our investigation of the elastic labor supply case
by studying the simpler case of a lump-sum tax, T . In this case, the rst order
conditions to the individuals optimization problem (incorporating the governments
budget constraint, T = B)11 can be written as
w u0

w bL B   bS  d0 bL = 0; (37)
 u0

wbL B   bS+Rv0 RbS +B = 0: (38)
As before, using (37)-(38), we can derive the equilibrium responses of saving and
employment to changes inB; and evaluate them nearB = 0: Let @ bJ
@B

ls
where bJ = bL; bS
denote a change in the optimal J brought on by a increase in B (evaluated near
B = 0) when B is nanced by a lump-sum tax.
Proposition 2. For a dynamically-e¢ cient economy, with endogenous labor supply,
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there is no welfare case for introducing a PAYG pension nanced by a lump-sum tax.
The proof is in the appendix and proceeds by proving that under a lump-sum
tax nancing scheme,
bLB
ls
> 0 if R > 1; bSB
ls
< 0 if R > 1;
(reducing capital and raising labor supply), and hence, from (36) it follows that
the capital-labor ratio necessarily falls. Accordingly, from (35), there would be no
welfare case for a unfunded public pension in this case, as stated in Proposition 2.
Note however,
bLB
ls
< 0 if R < 1; bSB
ls
< 0 if R < 1;
hence, the sign of @bk
@B
is not immediate when R < 1: In other words, the case for
a public pension in a dynamically-ine¢ cient economy is not clear-cut even if the
pension is nanced with a lump-sum tax.
Payroll tax. More generally, though, as is well known, an income tax releases
both a substitution and income e¤ect, and if the former dominates (see Assumption
A1), it follows that labor supply decreases with a tax increase, cf Lemma 1, and
this goes in the direction of increasing the capital-labor ratio. The distortion arising
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via the substitution e¤ect thus makes the welfare e¤ect of the public pension more
complicated.
As the next lemma shows, relative to when a lump-sum tax is used, bLB is smaller
(because of the substitution e¤ect) when a payroll tax replaces the lump-sum tax.
Lemma 6.
bLB
B=0
<
8><>:
bLB
ls
> 0 if R > 1
bLB
ls
< 0 if R < 1
bSB
B=0
< bSB
ls
< 0 for R ? 1
However, at the same time, bSB falls, making it harder to evaluate the overall
e¤ect on (36). Using Lemma 6 and Lemma 3, we can re-write (36) as
bSB
B=0
  bk bLB
B=0
= bSB
ls
  bk bLB
ls
+
u0() 1bL [u00()w]
D
  bku0() 1bL [u00() + v00()R2]
D
(39)
where D > 0: For R > 1; Lemma 6 proves that
bSB
ls
  bk bLB
ls
< 0:
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Hence, for a dynamically-e¢ cient economy, it follows from (39) that (36) holds if
u0() 1bL [u00()w]  bk

u0() 1bL u00() + v00()R2

< 0: (40)
Lemma 7. a) If
1  0v  0u (41)
(as dened in (29)) holds, then (40) is satised.1213
Notice that (30), consequent to Assumptions A1-A2, had already imposed 1  0v;
and 1  0u: It also deserves mention that both v and u are, in general, endogenous
variables. The restriction in (41) translates into a parametric condition for the
commonly-used CRRA form of time-separable utility.
Lemma 8. Suppose U (c1; c2; L) = 11  c
1 
1 +
1
1 c
1 
2   11+L1+;  > 0;  > 0;  >
0;  > 0: Then (41) holds if 1    :
For future use,  () is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion for the fe-
licity of the young (old) and  is the curvature parameter for labor supply. Clearly, if
(41) holds, i.e., the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion for the felicity of the
old is no less than that of the young, it follows from (39) that forR > 1; bSB bkbLB < 0
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is true, i.e., (36) holds. The implication is that in a dynamically-e¢ cient economy,
there is no case for introducing a PAYG pension scheme if (41) holds.
However, when R < 1; it follows from Lemma 6 that bSB
ls
 bk bLB
ls
is of indeter-
minate sign, and hence, it appears that satisfaction of (40) may no longer be enough
to ensure (36) holds.
Proposition 3. a) In a dynamically-e¢ cient economy, there is no case for introduc-
ing a PAYG pension scheme if (41) holds.
b) In a dynamically-ine¢ cient economy, there is a case for introducing a PAYG pen-
sion scheme if (41) holds.
The upshot of the above analysis is the following. For an initially dynamically-
e¢ cient economy, there is no welfare rationale for introducing a PAYG pension sys-
tem if the old are at least as risk averse as the young. Under that same su¢ cient
condition, there is a welfare rationale for introducing a PAYG pension system if
the economy is initially dynamically ine¢ cient. In short, the Aaron-Samuelson re-
sult (both sides of it) extends to economies with elastic labor supply under a mild
su¢ cient condition.
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4.3. Numerics. We close with a numerical example, one designed to illustrate
several important points. First, via this example, we wish to prove that the in-
tersection of various restrictions imposed heretofore is not vacuous (i.e., a valid
equilibrium does exist and exhibits the Aaron-Samuelson result). Second, we wish
to underscore the point that (41) is merely a su¢ cient condition. For example, as the
four-panel diagram below will illustrate, in a dynamically-ine¢ cient economy, there
may be a case for introducing a PAYG pension scheme even if (41) does not hold.
Finally, we wish to leave the reader with some sense of the subsets of the parameter
space for which the PAYG pension system is a good idea or not.
Example: Suppose U (c1; c2; L) = 11  c
1 
1 + 
1
1 c
1 
2   11+L1+; with  = 1
and F (K;L) = 5K0:4L0:6: The four-panel diagram below plots combinations of  2
[0:5; 3] against  2 [0:5; 3] for which the steady-state welfare maximizing value of
B is zero or positive, holding  xed at 0:5; 1.4, 2, and 3 respectively.
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 = 0:5  = 1:4
 = 2  = 3
Figure 1: Combinations of  and  generating B > 0
As Figure 1 illustrates, there is a range of values for  and  typically,  2 (1; 3)
and  2 (0:6; 1:2) for which the PAYG pension system is a good idea (B > 0 in
the pictures above). For these ranges of  and ; condition (41) typically does
not hold; additionally, the economy is initially dynamically ine¢ cient, i.e., RB=0 < 1
obtains. Outside of these ranges, introducing a PAYG pension scheme is not welfare-
enhancing.
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5. Concluding remarks
The classic Aaron-Samuelson result argues that there is no welfare case for introduc-
ing a PAYG pension scheme if the initial steady state in a standard Diamond model
(with xed labor supply) is dynamically e¢ cient. On the ip side, it suggests that
a welfare rationale for the same exists if the initial steady state is dynamically inef-
cient. In this paper, we ask whether these results extend to an otherwise-identical
model with endogenous labor supply. The question is of some value because the
literature, employing DSGE models with numerous realistic features (such as un-
certainty, altruism, incomplete markets, and so on), has delivered a quantitative
verdict against such pensions in dynamically e¢ cient economies; and yet, the qual-
itative dimensions of the issue have not been fully addressed in a simple, baseline
Diamond model.
In this paper, we show that the generalization to the case with endogenous labor
supply and payroll-tax nanced pensions is not trivial. Asking whether there is
a welfare gain from introducing a PAYG pension, we show by use of a stability
condition that the answer depends on whether the initial steady state is dynamically
e¢ cient or ine¢ cient, and on whether the capital-labor ratio increases or decreases.
While savings unambiguously decrease and this goes in the direction of lowering
the capital-labor ratio, labor supply, and hence employment, may also decrease,
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precisely because the payroll tax is distortionary. We are able to show that for an
initially dynamically-e¢ cient economy, there is no welfare rationale for introducing a
PAYG pension system if the old are at least as risk averse as the young. Under that
same condition, there is a welfare rationale for introducing a PAYG pension system
if the economy is initially dynamically ine¢ cient. In short, the Aaron-Samuelson
result (both sides of it) extends to economies with elastic labor supply under a mild
su¢ cient condition.
40
Appendix
A. Individual saving and labor supply
Using the rst order conditions (7) and (8), it is easy to check that
 L =  w [u00 () (1  )wL+ u0 ()] > 0 (Assumption A1)
 LB = 0
 Lw = (1  ) [u00 () (1  )wL+ u0 ()] > 0 (Assumption A1)
 LR = 0
 S = u
00 ()wL < 0
 SB = Rv
00 () < 0
 Sw =  u00 () (1  )L > 0
 SR = RSv
00 () + v0 () > 0:(Assumption A2)
Note the time index has been suppressed. To gure out how optimal labor supply
and saving responds to the tax rate and the pension, we have from (7) and (8) that
264  SS  SL
 LS  LL
375
264 @S
@L
375 =
264    SB @B   S@    Sw@w    SR@R
  LB @B    L@    Lw@w    LR @R
375
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from where it follows
LB  @L
@B
=

 SS   SB
 LS   LB

D
=
  SS LB +  LS SB
D
=
 LS SB
D
< 0
L  @L
@
=

 SS   S
 LS   L

D
=
  SS L +  LS S
D
Lw  @L
@w
=

 SS   Sw
 LS   Lw

D
=
  SS Lw +  LS Sw
D
LR  @L
@R
=

 SS   SR
 LS   LR

D
=
 LS SR
D
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where D   SS LL    SL LS > 0 (see (9)). Also,
SB  @S
@B
=

  SB  SL
  LB  LL

D
=
  SB LL +  SL LB
D
=
  SB LL
D
< 0
S  @S
@
=

  S  SL
  L  LL

D
=
  S LL +  SL L
D
Sw  @S
@w
=

  Sw  SL
  Lw  LL

D
=
  Sw LL +  SL Lw
D
SR  @S
@R
=

  SR  SL
  LR  LL

D
=
  SR LL +  SL LR
D
=
  SR LL
D
:
First note that, since  LS > 0; and  LL < 0;
sign
@L
@R
= sign
@S
@R
> 0
and each is positive if  SR > 0 (Assumption A2).
1. @S
@
: Since D > 0; the sign of @S
@
is the same as the sign of (  S LL +  SL L )
which reduces to
 u00 ()wL u00 () ((1  )w)2   d00 ()+[ u00 () (1  )w]  u00 () (1  )w2L  u0 ()w
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and further simplies to
u00 ()w [Ld00 () + (1  )wu0 ()] < 0:
2. @L
@
: Since D > 0; the sign of @S
@
is the same as the sign of   SS L +  LS S
which reduces to
  u00 () +R2v00 ()  u00 () (1  )w2L  u0 ()w+[ u00 () (1  )w] [u00 ()wL]
and further reduces to
= w

u00 ()u0 () +R2v00 () fu0 () + u00 () (1  )Lwg < 0
3. @L
@w
: The sign of @L
@w
is the same as the sign of   SS Lw+ LS Sw which reduces
to
   u00 () +R2v00 ()  u00 () (1  )2wL+ u0 () (1  )+( u00 () (1  )w) ( u00 () (1  )L)
and further to
(1  ) R2wLu00 () v00 () (1  )  u0 ()  R2v00 () + u00 () > 0:
4. @S
@w
: The sign of @S
@w
is the same as the sign of   Sw LL +  SL Lw which is
positive since  Sw > 0;  LL < 0;  Lw > 0 and  SL > 0:
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B. Proof of Lemma 3
Using (27)-(28), the response of an increase in the wage rate (for xed R and B = 0)
on equilibrium labor supply is given by
bLw
B=0
 @
bL
@w

B=0
=

 u00 ()wbL  u0 ()  u00 ()w
u00()bL u00 () + v00 ()R2

u00 ()w2   d00 ()  u00 ()w
 u00 ()w u00 () + v00 ()R2

=
 
h
u00 ()wbL+ u0 ()i [u00 () + v00 ()R2] + (u00 ())2wbL
[u00 ()w2   d00 ()] [u00 () + v00 ()R2]  [u00 ()w]2
=
 v00 ()R2
h
u00 ()wbL+ u0 ()i  u00 ()u0 ()
A
:
where
A  u00 ()w2   d00 () u00 () + v00 ()R2 [u00 ()w]2 = R2v00 ()u00 ()w2 u00 () d00 () > 0;
(42)
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Notice A is simply D evaluated at  = 0: Under Assumption A1, it follows that
@bL
@w
> 0. Similarly,
bSw
B=0
=

u00 ()w2   d00 ()  
h
u00 ()wbL+ u0 ()i
 u00()w u00()bL

u00 ()w2   d00 ()  u00 ()w
 u00 ()w u00 () + v00 ()R2

=
[u00 ()w2   d00 ()]
h
u00 () bLi  hu00 ()wbL+ u0 ()iu00 ()w
A
=
u00 ()w2u00 () bL  d00 ()u00 () bL  u00 ()wbLu00 ()w   u0 ()u00 ()w
A
=
 d00 ()u00 () bL  u0 ()u00 ()w
A
> 0
The rate of return responses are as follows:
@bL
@R

B=0
=
u00 ()w
h
 v0 () Rv00 () bSi
A
@ bS
@R

B=0
=
h
 v0 () Rv00 () bSi [u00 ()w2   d00 ()]
A
from where it is clear that
sign
@bL
@R
= sign
@ bS
@R
= sign
h
v0 () +RbSv00 ()i
B=0
= sign

1  0v

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Hence,
0v  1() sign
@bL
@R
= sign
@ bS
@R
 0:
Finally, the benet responses are as follows:
bLB
B=0
=

u00 ()w + u0 () 1bL  u00 ()w
  [u00 () +Rv00 ()] [u00 () + v00 ()R2]

A
=
h
u00 ()w + u0 () 1bL
i
[u00 () + v00 ()R2]  [u00 ()w] [u00 () +Rv00 ()]
A
bSB
B=0
=

u00 ()w2   d00 () u00 ()w + u0 () 1bL
 u00 ()w   [u00 () +Rv00 ()]

A
=
  [u00 ()w2   d00 ()] [u00 () +Rv00 ()] +
h
u00 ()w + u0 () 1bL
i
[u00 ()w]
A
The latter expressions are easily reduced to
bLB
B=0
=
u0 () 1bL [u00 () + v00 ()R2] + v00 ()u00 ()wR (R  1)
A
< 0 if R < 1: (43)
and
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bSB
B=0
=
d00 () [u00 () +Rv00 ()] Rv00 () u00 ()w2 + wRu0 () 1
L

+ wu0 () 1
L
[u00 () + v00 ()R2]
A
(44)
=
d00 () [u00 () +Rv00 ()] Rv00 ()u00 ()w2 + wu0 () 1bLu00 ()
A
< 0:
C. Proof of Lemma 4
The characteristic polynomial is given by p ()  2 + A1 + A0. Stability (saddle-
point) requires one characteristic root to satisfy j1j < 1 and the other, j2j > 1:
Evaluated for  = 1; we get
p (1) = 1 + A1 + A0 = 1 +
hhbL  bk bLwkRki  bSRRkibk bLRRk +
bSwbLR
which, after routine simplication yields,
p (1) =
1bk bLRRk
hbL+ h bLR   bk bLwi kRk   bSRRk + bSwkRki :
Notice p ( 1) = 1   A1 + A0 > 0: Then, saddle path stability requires p (1) < 0 or
that
1 + A1 + A0 =
1bk bLRRk
hbL+ hbLR   bk bLwi bkRk   bSRRk + bSwbkRki < 0:
Since bLR > 0 holds (see (31)), saddle path stability requires
hbL+ hbLR   bk bLwi bkRk   bSRRk + bSwbkRki > 0
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hold. For future use, note that using wk =  bkRk; this last condition may be written
as
bL  bLRwk + bkwk bLw   bSRRk   bSwwk > 0: (45)
It follows from the denition of  (k) that
0 (k) = 1 
bSwwk + bSRRk bL  bS bLwwk + bLRRkbL2 > 0:
Using bS  bK and bk  bK=bL; we can rewrite this as
bL  bSwwk + bSRRk+ bLwbkwk   bLRwk > 0
the same as (45).
D. Proof of Lemma 5
Noting that bk  bK=bL; it follows that
@bk
@B
=
bkbK @ bK@B   bkbL @bL@B
and
bL @bk
@B
=
"
@ bK
@B
  bk @bL
@B
#
:
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Since bK  bS(B;w bk ; Rbk); we have
@ bK
@B
= bSB + hbSwwk + bSRRki @bk
@B
and since bL  bLB;w bk ; Rbk ; we have
@bL
@B
= bLB + h bLwwk + bLRRki @bk
@B
:
Then,
bL @k
@B
=
@ bK
@B
  bk @bL
@B
= bSB + hbSwwk + bSRRki @bk
@B
  bk bLB + h bLwwk + bLRRki @bk
@B
, @
bk
@B
=
bSB   bk bLBbL  hbSwwk + SRRki+ bk hbLwwk + bLRRki :
From (32), we have
bL+ hbLR   bk bLwi bkRk   bSRRk + bSwbkRk > 0:
Using wk =  bkRk; we can rewrite the previous condition as
bL bSRRk bSwwk  bLRwk+bkLwwk > 0) bL bSRRk + bSwwk+ bk hbLRRk + bLwwki > 0
the same as the denominator of @bk
@B
: It follows that at a saddle-point stable bk;
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sign
"
@bk
@B
#
= sign
hbSB   bkbLBi
E. Proof of Proposition 2
If the pension is nanced by a lump-sum tax levied on the young, the rst order
condition to the individual optimization problem can be written as
u0

wt bLt  B   bSt [wt]  d0 bLt = 0
 u0

wt bLt  B   bSt+Rt+1v0 Rt+1 bSt +B = 0:
Note that the rst order conditions are evaluated in equilibriummaking use of T = B.
Hence, totally di¤erentiating yields
u00()
h bL@w + w@bL  @B   dSiwt + u0()@w   d00()@bL = 0
 u00()
h bL@w + wdbL  @B   @ bSi+ @Rv0() +Rv00() hbS@R +R@ bS + @Bi = 0
Evaluating these expressions for B = 0 yields

u00()w2   d00() @bL+ [ u00()w] @ bS = h u00()wbLi @w + [u00()w] @B
[ u00()w] @bL+ u00() +R2v00() @ bS = u00()bL@w   [u00() +Rv00()] @B + h v0() Rv00()bSi @R:
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Then,
@bL
@B

ls
=

u00()w  u00()w
  [u00() +Rv00()] [u00() + v00()R2]

u00()w2   d00()  u00()w
 u00()w u00() + v00()R2

which may be simplied to yield
@bL
@B

ls
=
u00()wv00()R (R  1)
A
7 0 if R 7 1
since A > 0 (see (42)). Similarly,
@ bS
@B

ls
=

u00()w2   d00()
 u00()w
u00()w
  [u00() +Rv00()]

u00()w2   d00()  u00 ()w
 u00()w u00 () + v00 ()R2

;
which may be simplied to yield
@ bS
@B

ls
=
d00() [u00() +Rv00()]  u00()w2Rv00()
D
< 0:
Hence, under lump-sum taxation we have
@bL
@B

ls
7 0 if R 7 1; @
bS
@B

ls
< 0:
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F. Proof of Lemma 6
Using (44)-(43), and the expressions derived in the proof of Proposition 2, we have
@bL
@B
=
@bL
@B

ls
+
u0() 1bL [u00() + v00()R2]
A
<
@bL
@B

ls
;
@ bS
@B
=
@ bS
@B

ls
+
u0() 1bL [u00()w]
A
<
@ bS
@B

ls
;
where A > 0.
G. Proof of Lemma 7
It is easy to rewrite (40) as
u0() 1bL
n
u00()

w   bk  bkv00()R2o
noting c1 = (w   bk)bL and c2 = bkRbL; this is rewritten as
u0() 1bL2
n
u00()c1   bkbLv00()R2o
and further as
u0() 1bL2u0()

u00()c1
u0()  
c2v
00()
u0() R

:
The rest is immediate once (8) is invoked.
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H. Proof of Proposition 3
b) Using (44)-(43), it is possible to re-write bSB   bkbLB < 0 as
1bL
n
u0 ()bk u00 () + v00 ()R2  u0 ()wu00 ()o+Rv00 ()u00 ()w2+bkv00 ()u00 ()wR (R  1) > d00 () [u00 () +Rv00 ()]
(46)
Under the condition, 0v  0u; the rst term (in parenthesis) on the l.h.s of (46) is
positive. The second term on the l.h.s of (46) is positive. When R < 1; the third
term on the l.h.s of (46) is negative. Also, the r.h.s of (46) is negative. Thus, under
(41), for bSB   bkbLB < 0; it is su¢ cient that
Rv00 ()u00 ()w2 + bkv00 ()u00 ()wR (R  1) > 0:
It is easy to show that
Rv00 ()u00 ()w2 +bkv00 ()u00 ()wR (R  1) = Rwv00 ()u00 () hw   bk+Rbki > 0
since c1 = (w   bk)bL > 0:
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1*The authors thank an associate editor, Brent Kreider, Xiying Liu and Donggyu
Yi for helpful comments, and Marcelo Oviedo, Rajesh Singh and Min Wang for
help with some of the computations. We also acknowledge nancial support from
the Danish Council for Independent Research (Social Sciences) under the Danish
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation.
1Indeed, among academic economists, a verdict against unfunded pension systems
has come to be generally accepted. Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2007)
describe the overall debate, and the dénoument as follows: The unfunded public
pension system provides insurance against mortality and individual income risks for
which insurance through private markets is either unavailable or di¢ cult due to
moral hazard and other reasons. At the same time, the unfunded system distorts the
saving and labour supply decisions and imposes a deadweight cost on the society.
When these two sets of e¤ects of social security are evaluated in economic models,
it is almost always the case that the unfunded system has an overall welfare cost on
the households.
2It is well-known that introduction of a PAYG pension scheme bestows the initial
old generation with a gift. These transitional gains have to be weighed against the
more permanent consequences of such a scheme. In DSGE, quantitatively-oriented
models, such as Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987), Conesa and Krueger (1999), Conesa
and Garriga (2003), and Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2007), these transi-
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tional gains are given substantial prominence. In the following, we follow the quali-
tativeliterature derived from Breyer and Straub (1993) and conne our analysis to
steady-state e¤ects.
3For example, the role played by unfunded pension systems in ameliorating idio-
syncratic risks (such as, those involving mortality or labor income) in worlds with
incomplete nancial markets has been highlighted and surveyed in Krueger (2006).
Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011) and Caliendo and Gahramanov (2010) study the
importance of agent myopia in providing a justication for such pension systems.
Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2007) introduce bi-directional altruism along
with mortality and earnings risks in a framework similar to one adopted by Conesa
and Krueger (1999). Cooley and Soares (1999) explore a political-economy justica-
tion for PAYG pensions see Galasso and Profeta (2004) for a survey.
4Life-cycle models with endogenous labor supply have been used extensively in the
social security literature (see, for example, Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987), Homburg
(1990), Breyer and Straub (1993), and Heijdra and Mierau (2010).
5As noted earlier, the literature, employing DSGE models with simultaneous,
multiple realistic features (such as uncertainty, altruism, incomplete markets, and so
on), has delivered a quantitativeverdict against PAYG pensions in dynamically-
e¢ cient economies. However, the qualitative dimensions of the issue (especially the
analytics of the extension to elastic labor supply) have not been fully addressed in a
simple, baseline Diamond model.
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6A version of this result appears in Breyer and Straub (1993).
7In places below, we consider as a benchmark, a lump-sum tax on wage income.
In that case, if T is the lump-sum tax, the analog of (4) is T = B:
8Breyer and Straub (1993) consider three di¤erent formulations of the PAYG
scheme: a) xed contribution rate  but pensions are tied to past labor supply, b)
time-varying contribution rate, and c) lump-sum contributions and benets.
9There is little consensus about whether the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is
less than or greater than one. The usual values for these utility parameters that are
popular in the literature see Meyer and Meyer (2005) for instance are estimated,
either from static, micro studies or for time horizons of a quarter or less. Otrok
(2001) in a study of the welfare cost of business cycles estimates it to be 0.72 with
a 90% condence interval of [0.54, 0.95]. Five out of six of Hansen and Singletons
(1983) estimates, ranging from 0.17 to 1.36, are also smaller than one.
10In a small open economy, R = f 0 (k) is xed, implying k is xed; hence, if R < 1;
U 0 (0) > 0 clearly holds.
11See footnote 7.
12Notice that (30) had already imposed 1  0v; and 1  0u:
13Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) use survey data from the University of Michi-
gan Health and Retirement Study. Their estimation procedure resulted in 2,376
household-level observations of the relative risk aversion parameter with a median
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value of 0.88. Notably, they nd that being age 65 or older signicantly increases
ones risk aversion by 36.22 percent to 38.26 percent.(pg. 14). Salm (2010) stud-
ies 583 elderly (over-65) respondents combining data from waves ve and six of the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and nds a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
for the old of about 0.55.
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